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Abstract: The risks of publishing privacy-sensitive data have received considerable attention recently. Several de-
anonymization attacks have been proposed to re-identify individuals even if data anonymization techniques
were applied. However, there is no theoretical quantification for relating the data utility that is preserved by
the anonymization techniques and the data vulnerability against de-anonymization attacks.
In this paper, we theoretically analyze the de-anonymization attacks and provide conditions on the utility
of the anonymized data (denoted by anonymized utility) to achieve successful de-anonymization. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first work on quantifying the relationships between anonymized util-
ity and de-anonymization capability. Unlike previous work, our quantification analysis requires no as-
sumptions about the graph model, thus providing a general theoretical guide for developing practical de-
anonymization/anonymization techniques.
Furthermore, we evaluate state-of-the-art de-anonymization attacks on a real-world Facebook dataset to show
the limitations of previous work. By comparing these experimental results and the theoretically achievable
de-anonymization capability derived in our analysis, we further demonstrate the ineffectiveness of previous
de-anonymization attacks and the potential of more powerful de-anonymization attacks in the future.
1 INTRODUCTION
Individual users’ data such as social relation-
ships, medical records and mobility traces are
becoming increasingly important for application
developers and data-mining researchers. These data
usually contain sensitive and private information
about users. Therefore, several data anonymization
techniques have been proposed to protect users’
privacy (Hay et al., 2007), (Liu and Terzi, 2008),
(Pedarsani and Grossglauser, 2011).
The privacy-sensitive data that are closely related
to individual behavior usually contain rich graph
structural characteristics. For instance, social network
data can be modeled as graphs in a straightforward
manner. Mobility traces can also be modeled as graph
topologies according to (Srivatsa and Hicks, 2012).
Many people nowadays have accounts through
various social networks such as Facebook, Twitter,
Google+, Myspace and Flicker. Therefore, even
equipped with advanced anonymization techniques,
the privacy of structural data still suffers from
de-anonymization attacks assuming that the ad-
versaries have access to rich auxiliary information
from other channels (Backstrom et al., 2007),
(Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008),
(Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2009),
(Srivatsa and Hicks, 2012), (Ji et al., 2014),
(Nilizadeh et al., 2014). Narayanan et al.
(Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2009) effectively
de-anonymized a Twitter dataset by utilizing a
Flickr dataset as auxiliary information based on
the inherent cross-site correlations. Nilizadeh et
al. (Nilizadeh et al., 2014) exploited the com-
munity structure of graphs to de-anonymize
social networks. Furthermore, Srivatsa et al.
(Srivatsa and Hicks, 2012) proposed to de-anonymize
a set of location traces based on a social network.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there
is no work on theoretically quantifying the data
anonymization techniques to defend against de-
anonymization attacks. In this paper, we aim to
theoretically analyze the de-anonymization attacks in
order to provide effective guidelines for evaluating
the threats of future de-anonymization attacks. We
aim to rigorously evaluate the vulnerabilities of exist-
ing anonymization techniques. For an anonymization
approach, not only the users’ sensitive information
should be protected, but also the anonymized data
should remain useful for applications, i.e., the
anonymized utility should be guaranteed. Then,
under what range of anonymized utility, is it possible
for the privacy of an individual to be broken? We will
quantify the vulnerabilities of existing anonymization
techniques and establish the inherent relationships
between the application-specific anonymized utility
and the de-anonymization capability. Our quantifi-
cation not only provides theoretical foundations for
existing de-anonymization attacks, but also can serve
as a guide for designing new de-anonymization and
anonymization schemes. For example, the com-
parison between the theoretical de-anonymization
capability and the practical experimental results of
current de-anonymization attacks demonstrates the
ineffectiveness of existing de-anonymization attacks.
Overall, we make the following contributions:
• We theoretically analyze the performance
of structure-based de-anonymization attacks
through formally quantifying the vulnerabilities
of anonymization techniques. Furthermore, we
rigorously quantify the relationships between the
de-anonymization capability and the utility of
anonymized data, which is the first such attempt
to the best of our knowledge. Our quantification
provides theoretical foundations for existing
structure-based de-anonymization attacks, and
can also serve as a guideline for evaluating
the effectiveness of new de-anonymization and
anonymization schemes through comparing their
corresponding de-anonymization performance
with our derived theoretical bounds.
• To demonstrate the ineffectiveness of existing de-
anonymization attacks, we implemented these at-
tacks on a real-world Facebook dataset. Exper-
imental results show that previous methods are
not robust to data perturbations and there is a sig-
nificant gap between their de-anonymization per-
formance and our derived theoretically achiev-
able de-anonymization capability. This analysis
further demonstrates the potential of developing
more powerful de-anonymization attacks in the
future.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Challenges for Anonymization
Techniques
Privacy preservation on structural data has been
studied extensively. The naive method is to
remove users’ personal identities (e.g., names,
social security numbers), which, unfortunately,
is rather vulnerable to structure-based de-
anonymization attacks (Backstrom et al., 2007),
(Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008),
(Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2009),
(Hay et al., 2008), (Liu and Terzi, 2008),
(Srivatsa and Hicks, 2012), (Ji et al., 2014),
(Sharad and Danezis, 2014),
(Sharad and Danezis, 2013), (Nilizadeh et al., 2014),
(Buccafurri et al., 2015). An advanced mechanism,
k-anonymity, was proposed in (Hay et al., 2008),
which obfuscates the attributes of users so that each
user is indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other
users. Although k-anonymity has been well adopted,
it still suffers from severe privacy problems due to
the lack of diversity with respect to the sensitive
attributes as stated in (Machanavajjhala et al., 2007).
Differential privacy (Dwork, 2006), (Liu et al., 2016)
is a popular privacymetric that statistically minimizes
the privacy leakage. Sala et al. in (Sala et al., 2011)
proposed to share a graph in a differentially private
manner. However, to enable the applicability of
such an anonymized graph, the differential pri-
vate parameter should not be large, which would
thus make their method ineffective in defending
against structure-based de-anonymization attacks
(Ji et al., 2014). Hay et al. in (Hay et al., 2007)
proposed a perturbation algorithm that applies a
sequence of r edge deletions followed by r other
random edge insertions. However, their method
also suffers from structure-based de-anonymization
attacks as shown in (Nilizadeh et al., 2014).
In summary, existing anonymization techniques
are subject to two intrinsic limitations: 1) they are
not scalable and thus would fail on high-dimensional
datasets; 2) They are susceptible to adversaries that
leverage the rich amount of auxiliary information to
achieve structure-based de-anonymization attacks.
2.2 De-anonymization Techniques
Structure-based de-anonymization was first intro-
duced in (Backstrom et al., 2007), where both active
and passive attacks were discussed. However, the
limitation of scalability reduces the effectiveness of
both attacks.
(Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008) utilized the
Internet movie database as the source of background
knowledge to successfully identify users’ Netflix
records, uncovering their political preferences
and other potentially sensitive information. In
(Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2009), the authors fur-
ther de-anonymized a Twitter dataset using a Flickr
dataset as auxiliary information. They proposed the
popular seed identification and mapping propagation
process for de-anonymization. In order to obtain the
seeds, they assume that the attacker has access to a
small number of members of the target network and
can determine if these members are also present in
the auxiliary network (e.g., by matching user names
and other contextual information). The authors in
(Srivatsa and Hicks, 2012) captured the WiFi hotspot
and constructed a contact graph by connecting users
who are likely to utilize the same WiFi hotspot for a
long time. Based on the fact that friends (or people
with other social relationships) are likely to appear
in the same location, they showed how mobility
traces can be de-anonymized using an auxiliary
social network. However, their de-anonymization
approach is rather time-consuming and may be
computationally infeasible for real applications.
In (Sharad and Danezis, 2013), (Sharad and Danezis, 2014),
Sharad et al. studied the de-anonymization attacks on
ego graphs with graph radius of one or two and they
only studied the linkage of nodes with degree greater
than 5. As shown in previous work (Ji et al., 2014),
nodes with degree less than 5 cannot be ignored
since they form a large portion of the original
real-world data. Recently, (Nilizadeh et al., 2014)
proposed a community-enhanced de-anonymization
scheme for social networks. The community-level
de-anonymization is first implemented for finding
more seed information, which would be leveraged
for improving the overall de-anonymization perfor-
mance. Their method may, however, suffer from
the serious inconsistency problem of community
detection algorithms.
Most de-anonymization attacks are based on
the seed-identification scheme, which either relies
on the adversary’s prior knowledge or a seed map-
ping process. Limited work has been proposed
that requires no prior seed knowledge by the ad-
versary (Pedarsani et al., 2013),(Ji et al., 2014). In
(Pedarsani et al., 2013), the authors proposed a
Bayesian-inference approach for de-anonymization.
However, their method is limited to de-anonymizing
sparse graphs. (Ji et al., 2014) proposed a cold-
start optimization-based de-anonymization attack.
However, they only utilized very limited structural
information (degree, neighborhood, top-K reference
distance and sampling closeness centrality) of the
graph topologies.
Ji et al. further made a detailed comparison
for the performance of existing de-anonymization
techniques in (Ji et al., 2015b).
2.3 Theoretical Work for
De-anonymization
Despite these empirical de-anonymization meth-
ods, limited research has provided theoreti-
cal analysis for such attacks. The authors in
(Pedarsani and Grossglauser, 2011) conducted pre-
liminary analysis for quantifying the privacy of an
anonymized graph G according to the ER graph
model (Erdo˝s and Re´nyi, 1976). However, their
network model (ER model) may not be realistic,
since the degree distribution of the ERmodel (follows
the Poisson distribution) is quite different from the
degree distributions of most observed real-world
structural data (Newman, 2010), (Newman, 2003).
Ji et al. in (Ji et al., 2014) further considered
a configuration model to quantify perfect de-
anonymization and (1−ε)-perfect de-anonymization.
However, their configurationmodel is also not general
for many real-world data structures. Furthermore,
their assumption that the anonymized and the auxil-
iary graphs are sampled from a conceptual graph is
not practical since only edge deletions from the con-
ceptual graph have been considered. In reality, edge
insertions should also be taken into consideration.
Besides, neither (Pedarsani and Grossglauser, 2011)
nor (Ji et al., 2014) formally analyzed the relation-
ships between the de-anonymization capability and
the anonymization performance (e.g., the utility
performance for the anonymization schemes).
Note that our theoretical analysis in Section 4
takes the application-specific utility definition into
consideration. Such non-linear utility analysis
makes the incorporation of edge insertions to our
quantification rather nontrivial. Furthermore, our
theoretical quantification does not make any restric-
tive assumptions about the graph model. Therefore,
our theoretical analysis would provide an important
guide for relating de-anonymization capability and
application-specific anonymizing utility.
Further study on de-anonymization attacks can
be found in (Fabiana et al., 2015), (Ji et al., 2015a),
(Korula and Lattanzi, 2014). These papers provide
theoretically guaranteed performance bounds for
their de-anonymization algorithms. However, their
derived performance bounds can only be guaranteed
under restricted assumptions of the random graph,
such as ER model and power-law model. We will
show the advantage of our analysis over these ap-
proaches where our analysis requires no assumptions
or constraints on the graph model as these approaches
required.
3 SYSTEMMODEL
We model the structural data (e.g., social net-
works, mobility traces, etc.) as a graph, where the
nodes represent users who are connected by certain
relationships (social relationships, mobility contacts,
etc.). The anonymized graph can be modeled as Ga =
(Va,Ea), where Va = {i|i is an anonymized node} is
the set of users and Ea = {ea(i, j)|ea(i, j) is the re-
lationship between i ∈ Va and j ∈ Va} is the set of
relationships. Here, ea(i, j) = 1 represents the exis-
tence of a connecting edge between i and j in Ga, and
ea(i, j) = 0 represents the non-existence of such an
edge. The neighborhood of node i ∈ Va is Na(i) =
{ j|ea(i, j) = 1} and the degree is defined as |Na(i)|.
Similarly, the auxiliary structural data can also
be modeled as a graph Gu = (Vu,Eu) where Vu is
the set of labelled (known) users and Eu is the
set of relationships between these users. Note
that the auxiliary (background) data can be easily
obtained through various channels, e.g., academic
data mining, online crawling, advertising and third-
party applications (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2009;
Pedarsani and Grossglauser, 2011; Pham et al., 2013;
Srivatsa and Hicks, 2012).
A de-anonymization process is a mapping σ :
Va → Vu. ∀i ∈ Va, its mapping under σ is
σ(i) ∈ Vu ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ indicates a non-existent
(null) node. Similarly, ∀ea(i, j) ∈ Ea, σ(ea(i, j)) =
eu(σ(i),σ( j)) ∈ Eu∪{⊥}. Under σ, a successful de-
anonymization on i ∈ Va is defined as σ(i) = i, if
i ∈ Vu or σ(i) =⊥, otherwise. For other cases, the
de-anonymization on i fails.
3.1 ATTACK MODEL
We assume that the adversary has access to Ga =
(Va,Ea) and Gu = (Vu,Eu). Ga = (Va,Ea) is the
anonymized graph and the adversary can only get ac-
cess to the structural information ofGa. Gu =(Vu,Eu)
is the auxiliary graph and the adversary already knows
all the identities of the nodes in Gu. In addition, we
do not assume that the adversary has other prior in-
formation (e.g., seed information). These assump-
tions are more reasonable than most of the state-
of-the-art research (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2009;
Srivatsa and Hicks, 2012; Nilizadeh et al., 2014).
4 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide a theoretical analysis
for the structure-based de-anonymization attacks.
Under any anonymization technique, the users’
sensitive information should be protected without
significantly affecting the utility of the anonymized
data for real systems or research applications. We
aim to quantify the trade-off between preserving
users’ privacy and the utility of anonymized data.
Under what range of anonymized utility, is it possible
for the privacy of an individual to be broken (i.e.,
for the success of de-anonymization attacks)? To
answer this, we quantify the limitations of existing
anonymization schemes and establish an inherent
relationship between the anonymized utility and
de-anonymization capability. Our theoretical analysis
incorporates an application-specific utility metric
for the anonymized graph, which further makes
our rigorous quantification useful for real world
scenarios. Our theoretical analysis can serve as an
effective guideline for evaluating the performance of
practical de-anonymization/anonymization schemes
(will be discussed in Section 5).
First, we assume that there exists a conceptually
underlying graph G = (V,E) with V = Va ∪ Vu
and E is a set of relationships among users in V ,
where e(i, j) = 1 ∈ E represents the existence of a
connecting edge between i and j, and e(i, j) = 0 ∈ E
represents the non-existence of such an edge.
Consequently, Ga and Gu could be viewed as ob-
servable versions of G by applying edge insertions
or deletions on G according to proper relationships,
such as ‘co-occurrence’ relationships in Gowalla
(Pham et al., 2013). In comparison, previous work
(Ji et al., 2014; Pedarsani and Grossglauser, 2011)
only considers edge deletions which is an unrealistic
assumption.
For edge insertions from G to Ga, the process is:
∀e(i, j) = 0 ∈ E , e(i, j) = 1 appears in Ea with prob-
ability padda , i.e., Pr(ea(i, j) = 1|e(i, j) = 0) = p
add
a .
The probability of edge deletion from G to Ga is p
del
a ,
i.e., Pr(ea(i, j) = 0|e(i, j) = 1) = p
del
a . Similarly,
the insertions and deletions from G to Gu can be
characterized with probabilities paddu and p
del
u . Fur-
thermore, we assume that both the insertion/deletion
relationship of each edge is independent of every
other edge. Furthermore, this model is intuitively
reasonable since the three graphs G, Ga, Gu are
related with each other. In addition, our model
is more reasonable than the existing models in
(Ji et al., 2014; Pedarsani and Grossglauser, 2011)
because we take both edge deletions and insertions
into consideration. Note that the incorporation of
edge insertion is non-trivial in our quantification of
non-linear application-specific utility analysis. Our
quantification analysis would therefore contribute to
relating the real world application-specific anonymiz-
ing utility and the de-anonymization capability.
Adjacency matrix and transition probability ma-
trix are two important descriptions of a graph, and the
graph utility is also closely related to these matrices.
The adjacency matrix is a means of representing
which nodes of a graph are adjacent to which other
nodes. We denote the adjacency matrix by A (resp.
Aa and Au) for graph G (resp. Ga and Gu), where
the element A(i, j) = e(i, j) (resp. Aa(i, j) = ea(i, j)
and Au(i, j) = eu(i, j)). Furthermore, the transition
probability matrix is a matrix consisting of the one-
step transition probabilities, which is the probability
of transitioning from one node to another in a single
step. We denote the transition probability matrix
by T (resp. T a and T u) for graph G (resp. Ga
and Gu), where the element T (i, j) = e(i, j)/deg(i)
(resp. T a(i, j) = ea(i, j)/dega(i) and T u(i, j) =
eu(i, j)/degu(i)), and deg(i),dega(i),degu(i) repre-
sent the degree of node i in G,Ga,Gu, respectively.
We now define the smallest (l) and largest (h)
probabilities of an edge existing between two nodes
in the graph G, and the graph density (denoted by R).
For graph G, we denote |V | = N and |E| = M. Let
p(i, j) be the probability of an edge existing between
i, j ∈ V and define l = min{p(i, j)|i, j ∈ V, i 6= j},
h = max{p(i, j)|i, j ∈ V, i 6= j}, the expected number
of edges PT = ∑i, j∈V p(i, j) and the graph density
R= PT
(N2)
.
Then, we start our formal quantification from the
simplest scenario where the anonymized data and the
auxiliary data correspond to the same group of users
i.e., Va = Vu as in (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2009;
Pedarsani and Grossglauser, 2011;
Srivatsa and Hicks, 2012). This assumption does not
limit our theoretical analysis since we can either (a)
apply it to the overlapped users between Va and Vu
or (b) extend the set of users to V newa = Va ∪ (Vu\Va)
and V newu = Vu ∪ (Va\Vu), and apply the analysis to
Ga = (V
new
a ,Ea) and Gu = (V
new
u ,Eu). Therefore,
in order to prevent any confusion and without loss
of generality, we assume Va = Vu in our theoretical
analysis. We define σk as a mapping between Ga and
Gu that contains k incorrectly-mapped pairs.
Given a mapping σ : Va → Vu, we define the
Difference of Common Neighbors (DCN) on a node
i’s mapping σ(i) as φi,σ(i) = |N
i
a\N
σ(i)
u |+ |N
σ(i)
u \Nia|,
which measures the neighborhoods’ difference
between node i in Ga and node σ(i) in Gu un-
der the mapping σ. Then, we define the overall
DCN for all the nodes under the mapping σ as
Φσ = ∑(i,σ(i))∈σ φi,σ(i).
Next, we not only explain why structure-based
de-anonymization attacks work but also quantify
the trade-off between the anonymized utility and
the de-anonymization capability. We first quantify
the relationship between a straightforward utility
metric, named local neighborhood utility, and the
de-anonymization capability. Then we carefully
analyze a more general utility metric, named global
structure utility, to accommodate a broad class of
real-world applications.
4.1 Relation Between the Local
Neighborhood Utility and
De-anonymization Capability
At the beginning, we explore a straightforward util-
ity metric, local neighborhood utility, which evaluates
the distortion of the anonymized graph Ga from the
conceptually underlying graph G as
Definition 1. The local neighborhood utility for
the anonymized graph is Ua = 1−
||Aa−A||1
N(N−1) = 1−
E[D(Ga,G)]
N(N−1) (the denominator is a normalizing factor
to guarantee Ua ∈ [0,1]), where D(·, ·) is the ham-
ming distance (Hamming, 1950) of edges between two
graphs, i.e., if ea(i, j) 6= e(i, j), D(ea(i, j),e(i, j)) =
1 and E[D(Ga,G)] is the distortion between Ga
and G and E[D(Ga,G)] = E[∑
i, j
D(ea(i, j),e(i, j))] =
∑i, j(p(i, j)p
del
a +(1− p(i, j))p
add
a ).
Thus, we further have
Ua = 1−
∑i, j(p(i, j)p
del
a +(1− p(i, j))p
add
a )(
N
2
)
= 1− (Rpdela +(1−R)p
add
a )
(1)
Similarly, the local neighborhood utility for the aux-
iliary graph is
Uu = 1− (Rp
del
u +(1−R)p
add
u ) (2)
Though the utility metric for structural data is
application-dependent, our utility metric can pro-
vide a comprehensive understanding for utility per-
formance by considering both the edge insertions
and deletions, and incorporating the distance between
the anonymized (auxiliary) graph and the concep-
tual underlying graph. Although our utility is one
of the most straightforward definitions, to the best
of our knowledge, it is still the first scientific work
that theoretically analyzes the relationship between
de-anonymization performance and the utility of the
anonymized data.
Based on the local neighborhood utility in Defini-
tion 1, we theoretically analyze the de-anonymization
capability of structure-based attacks and quantify the
anonymized utility for successful de-anonymization.
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Figure 1: Visualization of utility region (green shaded) for successful de-anonymization under different scenarios. To guar-
antee the applicability of the anonymized data, the anonymized utility should be preserved by the anonymization techniques.
We theoretically demonstrate that successful de-anonymization can be achieved if the anonymized utility locates within these
shaded regions.
To improve readability, we defer the proof of Theo-
rem 1 to the Appendix.
Theorem 1 implies that as the number of nodes in
the graphsGa and Gu increase, the probability of suc-
cessful deanonymization approaches 1 when the four
conditions (in Eqs. 3,4,5,6) regarding graph density R,
and the smallest and largest probabilities of the edges
between nodes hold.
Theorem 1. For any σk 6= σ0, where k is the num-
ber of incorrectly-mapped nodes between Ga and Gu,
limn→∞Pr(Φσk ≥ Φσ0) = 1 when the following con-
ditions are satisfied.
Uu+ 2lUa > 1+ 2l−Rl (3)
Uu+2(1−h)Ua > 1+2(1−h)− (1−h)(1−R) (4)
Uu+ 2l
1−R
R
Ua > 1+ 2l
1−R
R
− l(1−R) (5)
Uu+2(1−h)
R
1−R
Ua> 1+2(1−h)
R
1−R
−R(1−h)
(6)
From Theorem 1, we know that when the lo-
cal neighborhood utility for the anonymized graph
and the auxiliary graph satisfies the four condi-
tions in Eqs. 3,4,5,6, we can achieve successful de-
anonymization from a statistical perspective. The rea-
son is that, the attacker can discover the correct map-
ping with high probability by choosing the mapping
with the minimal Difference of Common Neighbors
(DCN), out of all the possible mappings between the
anonymized graph and the auxiliary graph. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first work to quan-
tify the relationship between anonymized utility and
de-anonymization capability. It also essentially ex-
plains why structure-based de-anonymization attacks
work.
The four conditions in Theorem 1 can be reduced
to one or two conditions under four types of graph
density. Figure 1(a) is the triangular utility region for
R < min{0.5, 1−h
1−h+l} (where the graph density R is
smaller than 0.5 and 1−h
1−h+l ), which is only bounded
by Eq. 3. Figure 1(b) is the quadrilateral utility re-
gion for min{0.5, 1−h
1−h+l} ≤ R< 0.5 (where the graph
density R is larger than 1−h
1−h+l and smaller than 0.5),
which is bounded by Eq. 3 and Eq. 4. Simi-
larly, Figure 1(c) is the triangular utility region for
0.5 ≤ R < max{0.5, l
1−h+l} (where the graph den-
sity R is larger than l
1−h+l and 0.5), which is only
bounded by Eq. 6. Figure 1(d) is the quadrilateral util-
ity region for R ≥ max{0.5, l
1−h+l} (where the graph
density R is larger than 0.5 and smaller than l
1−h+l ),
which is bounded by Eq. 5 and Eq. 6. Therefore,
we not only analytically explain why the structure-
based de-anonymization works, but also theoretically
provide the bound of anonymized utlity for sucessful
de-anonymization. When the anonymized utility sat-
isfies the conditions in Theorem 1 (or locates within
the green shaded utility regions shown in Figure 1),
successful de-anonymization is theoretically achiev-
able.
4.2 Relation Between the Global
Structure Utility and
De-anonymization Capability
In Definition 1, we consider a straightforward local
neighborhood utility metric, which evaluates the dis-
tortion between the adjacency matrices of the two
graphs, i.e., ||Aa − A||1. However, the real-world
data utility is application-oriented such that we need
to consider a more general utility metric, to incor-
porate more aggregate information of the graph in-
stead of just the adjacency matrix. Motivated by
the general utility distance in (Mittal et al., 2013a;
Liu and Mittal, 2016), we consider to utilize the w-th
power of the transition probability matrix Tw, which
is induced by the w-hop random walk on graph G, to
define the global structure utility as follows:
Definition 2. The global structure utility for the
anonymized graph Ga is defined as
Ua(w) = 1−
||T wa −T
w||1
2N
(7)
where T wa ,T
w are the w-th power of the transition
probability matrix T a,T , respectively. The denomi-
nator in Eq. 7 is a normalization factor to guarantee
Ua(w) ∈ [0,1]. Similarly, the global structure utility
for the auxiliary graph is
Uu(w) = 1−
||T wu −T
w||1
2N
(8)
Our metric of global structure utility in Defi-
nition 2 is intuitively reasonable for a broad class
of real-world applications, and captures the w-hop
random walks between the original graph G and
the anonymized graph Ga. We note that ran-
dom walks are closely linked to structural prop-
erties of real-world data. For example, a lot of
high-level social network based applications such
as recommendation systems (Andersen et al., 2008),
Sybil defenses (Yu et al., 2008) and anonymity sys-
tems (Mittal et al., 2013b) directly perform random
walks in their protocols. The parameter w is appli-
cation specific; for applications that require access to
fine-grained community structure, such as recommen-
dation systems (Andersen et al., 2008), the value of w
should be small. For other applications that utilize
coarse and macro community structure of the data,
such as Sybil defense mechanisms (Yu et al., 2008),
w can be set to a larger value (typically around
10). Therefore, our global structure utility metric can
quantify the utility performance of a perturbed graph
for various real-world applications in a general and
universal manner.
Based on this general utility metric, we fur-
ther theoretically analyze the de-anonymization ca-
pability of structure-based attacks and quantify the
anonymized utility for successful de-anonymization.
To improve readability, we defer the proof of Theo-
rem 2 to the Appendix.
Theorem 2. For any σk 6= σ0, where k is the num-
ber of incorrectly-mapped nodes between Ga and Gu,
limn→∞Pr(Φσk ≥ Φσ0) = 1 when the following con-
ditions are satisfied:
Uu(w)+2lUa(w) > 1+2l−
wRl(N−1)
2
(9)
Uu(w)+2(1−h)Ua(w) > 1+2(1−h)−
w(N−1)(1−h)(1−R)
2
(10)
Table 1: De-anonymization Accuracy of State-of-the-Art
Approaches.
Datasets noise= 0.05 noise= 0.15 noise= 0.25
(Ji et al., 2014) 0.95 0.81 0.73
(Nilizadeh et al., 2014) 0.83 0.74 0.68
Uu(w)+2l
1−R
R
Ua(w) > 1+2l
1−R
R
−
wl(1−R)(N−1)
2
(11)
Uu(w)+2(1−h)
R
1−R
Ua(w) > 1+2(1−h)
R
1−R
−
wR(1−h)(N−1)
2
(12)
Similar to Theorem 1, when the global structure
utility for the anonymized graph and the auxiliary
graph satisfies all of the four conditions in Theorem
2, we can achieve successful de-anonymization from
a statistical perspective. With rather high probabil-
ity, the attacker can find out the correct mapping be-
tween the anonymized graph and the auxiliary graph,
by choosing the mapping with the minimal DCN out
of all the potential mappings.
Furthermore, both Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
give meaningful guidelines for future designs of de-
anonymization and anonymization schemes: 1) Since
successful de-anonymization is theoretically achiev-
able when the anonymized utility satisfies the condi-
tions in Theorem1 (for the local neighborhood utility)
and Theorem 2 (for the global structure utility), the
gap between the practical de-anonymization accuracy
and the theoretically achievable performance can be
utilized to evaluate the effectiveness of a real-world
de-anonymization attack; 2) we can also leverage
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 for designing future secure
data publishing to defend against de-anonymization
attacks. For instance, a secure data publishing scheme
should provide anonymized utility that locates out of
the theoretical bound (green shaded region) in Fig-
ure 1 while enabling real-world applications. We will
provide a practical analysis for such privacy and util-
ity tradeoffs in Section 5.
5 Practical Privacy and Utility
Trade-off
In this section, we show how the theoretical anal-
ysis in Section 4 can be utilized to evaluate the pri-
vacy risks of practical data publishing and the per-
formance of practical de-anonymization attacks. To
enable real-world applications without compromis-
ing the privacy of users, a secure data anonymiza-
tion scheme should provide anonymized utility which
does not locate within the utility region for perfect
de-anonymization shown as the green shaded regions
in Figure 1 (a) (d). From a data publisher’s point of
view, we consider the worst-case attacker who has ac-
cess to perfect auxiliary information, i.e., noiseu = 0.
Based on Theorem 1, we aim to quantify the amount
of noise that is added to the anonymized data for
achieving successful de-anonymization. After care-
ful derivations, we know that when the noise of the
anonymized graph is less than 0.25 (note that our
derivation is from a statistical point of view instead
of from the perspective of a concrete graph), success-
ful de-anonymization can be theoretically achieved
(proof is deferred to the Appendix). Therefore, when
the noise added to the anonymized graph is less than
0.25, there would be a serious privacy breach since
successful de-anonymization is theoretically achiev-
able. Note that such a utility bound only conser-
vatively provides the minimum noise that should be
added to the anonymized data. Practically, we sug-
gest a real-world data publisher to add more noise to
protect the privacy of the data. Furthermore, such
privacy-utility trade-off can be leveraged as a guide
for designing new anonymization schemes.
In addition, our derived theoretical analysis can
also be utilized to evaluate the performance of
existing de-anonymization attacks. We first im-
plement our experiments on the Facebook dataset
(Viswanath et al., 2009) which contains 46,952 nodes
(i.e., users) connected by 876,993 edges (i.e., so-
cial relationships). To evaluate the performance
of existing de-anonymization attacks, we con-
sider a popular perturbation method of Hay et
al. in (Hay et al., 2007), which applies a sequence
of r edge deletions followed by r random edge
insertions. A similar perturbation process has
been utilized for the de-anonymization attacks in
(Nilizadeh et al., 2014). Candidates for edge deletion
are sampled uniformly at random from the space of
the existing edges in graph G, while candidates for
edge insertion are sampled uniformly at random from
the space of edges that are not existing in G. Here,
we define noise (perturbations) as the extent of edge
modification, i.e., the ratio of altered edges r to the
total number of edges, i.e., noise= r
M
. Note that we
add the same amount of noise to the original graph
of the Facebook dataset to obtain the anonymized
graph and the auxiliary graph, respectively. Then, we
apply the state-of-the-art de-anonymization attacks
in (Ji et al., 2014) and (Nilizadeh et al., 2014) to de-
anonymize the anonymized graph by leveraging the
auxiliary graph.
We utilize Accuracy as an effective evaluation
metric to measure the de-anonymization perfor-
mance. Accuracy is the ratio of the correctly de-
anonymized nodes out of all the overlapped nodes be-
tween the anonymized graph and the auxiliary graph:
Accuracy=
Ncor
|Va∩Vu|
, (13)
where Ncor is the number of correctly de-anonymized
nodes. The Accuracy of these de-anonymization at-
tacks corresponding to different levels of noise is
shown in Table 1.
From Table 1, we can see that the state-of-the-art
de-anonymization attacks can only achieve less than
75% de-anonymization accuracy when the noise is
0.25, which demonstrates the ineffectiveness of previ-
ous work and the potential of developing more pow-
erful de-anonymization attacks in the future.
6 DISCUSSION
There is a clear trade-off between utility and
privacy for data publishing. In this work, we ana-
lytically quantify the relationships between the util-
ity of anonymized data and the de-anonymization ca-
pability. Our quantification results show that privacy
could be breached if the utility of anonymized data
is high. Hence, striking the balance between utility
and privacy for data publishing is important yet dif-
ficult - providing the high utility for real-world ap-
plications would decrease the data’s resistance to de-
anonymization attacks.
Suggestions for Secure Data Publishing. Secure
data publishing (sharing) is important for companies
(e.g., online social network providers), governments
and researchers. Here, we give several general guide-
lines: (i) Data owners should carefully evaluate the
potential vulnerabilities of the data before publishing.
For example, our quantification result in Section 4 can
be utilized to evaluate the vulnerabilities of the struc-
tural data. (ii) Data owners should develop proper
policies on data collections to defend against adver-
saries who aim to leverage auxiliary information to
launch de-anonymization attacks. To mitigate such
privacy threats, online social network providers, such
as Facebook, Twitter, and Google+, should reason-
ably limit the access to users’ social relationships.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first address several funda-
mental open problems in the structure-based de-
anonymization research by quantifying the condi-
tions for successful de-anonymization under a gen-
eral graph model. Next, we analyze the capability
of structure-based de-anonymization methods from a
theoretical point of view. We further provided theoret-
ical bounds of the anonymized utility for successful
de-anonymization. Our analysis provides a theoret-
ical foundation for structure-based de-anonymization
attacks, and can serve as a guide for designing new de-
anonymization/anonymization systems in practice.
Future work can include studying our utility versus
privacy trade-offs for more datasets, and designing
more powerful anonymization/de-anonymization ap-
proaches.
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APPENDIX
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof Sketch: First, we aim to derive paddua (i, j) which
is the projection process from Gu to Ga and p
del
ua (i, j)
which is the deletion process from Gu to Ga, to
have paddua (i, j) =
padda (1−p
add
u )(1−p(i, j))+(1−p
del
a )p
del
u p(i, j)
(1−paddu )(1−p(i, j))+p
del
u p(i, j)
and pdelua (i, j) =
(1−padda )p
add
u (1−p(i, j))+p
del
a (1−p
del
u )p(i, j)
paddu (1−p(i, j))+(1−p
del
u )p(i, j)
.
Then, we want to prove paddua (i, j) <
1
2
and
pdelua (i, j) <
1
2
. It is easy to show that they are equiv-
alent to (1− paddu )(1− 2p
add
a )(1− p(i, j)) > p
del
u (1−
2pdela )p(i, j) and p
add
u (1− 2p
add
a )(1− p(i, j)) < (1−
pdelu )(1 − 2p
del
a )p(i, j). From Eqs. 3,6,5,4, we
have 1
2
> max{paddu , p
del
u }. Similarly, we have
1
2
>
max{padda , p
del
a }. Now, we consider four different sit-
uations (a) pdelu ≥ p
add
u and p
del
a ≥ p
add
a , (b) p
del
u ≥ p
add
u
and pdela ≤ p
add
a , (c) p
del
u ≤ p
add
u and p
del
a ≥ p
add
a , and
(d) pdelu ≤ p
add
u and p
del
a ≤ p
add
a to prove p
add
ua (i, j)<
1
2
and pdelua (i, j)<
1
2
. Under σk, let V ku ⊆Vu be the set of
incorrectly de-anonymized nodes, Eku = {eu(i, j)|i ∈
V ku or j ∈ V
k
u } be the set of all the possible edges ad-
jacent to at least one user in V ku , E
τ
u = {eu(i, j)|i, j ∈
V ku ,(i, j) ∈ E
k
u , and ( j, i) ∈ E
k
u} be the set of all the
possible edges corresponding to transposition map-
pings in σk, and Eu = {eu(i, j)|1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n} be the
set of all the possible links on V . Furthermore, define
mk = |Eku | and m
τ = |Eτu|. Then, we have |V
k
u | = k,
mk =
(
k
2
)
+ k(n− k), mτ ≤ k
2
and |Eu|=
(
n
2
)
.
Now, we quantify Φσ0 from a statistical per-
spective. We define Φσ
k,E ′ as the DCN caused
by the edges in the set E ′ under the mapping
σk. Based on the definition of DCN, we ob-
tain Φσ
k
= Φσ
k,Eu\E
k
u + Φσ
k ,Eku\E
τ
u + Φσ
k ,Eτu and
Φσ0 = Φσ0,Eu\E
k
u + Φσ0,E
k
u\E
τ
u + Φσ0,E
τ
u . Since
Φσ
k,Eu\E
k
u = Φσ0,Eu\E
k
u and Φσ
k,Eτu = Φσ0,E
τ
u , we can
obtain Pr(Φσ
k
≥ Φσ0) = Pr(Φσ
k ,Eku\E
τ
u ≥ Φσ0,E
k
u\E
τ
u).
Considering ∀eu(i, j) ∈ E
k
u\E
τ
u under σ
k, we
know Φσ
k,eu(i, j) ∼ B(1, p(i, j)u(p(σk(i),σk( j))u ×
pdelua (i, j) + (1− p(σk(i),σk( j))u)× (1− p
add
ua (i, j))) +
(1 − p(i, j)u)(p(σk(i),σk( j))u × (1 − p
del
ua (i, j)) +
(1 − p(σk(i),σk( j))u) × p
add
ua (i, j))). Simi-
larly, under σ0 ∀eu(i, j) ∈ E
k
u\E
τ
u , we obtain
Φσ0,eu(i, j) ∼ B(1, p(i, j)up
del
ua +(1− p(i, j)u)p
add
ua ).
Let λσ0,eu(i, j) and λσ
k,eu(i, j) be the mean of
Φσ0,eu(i, j) and Φσ
k,eu(i, j), respectively. Then, we have
λσ
k,eu(i, j) > p(i, j)up
del
ua + (1 − p(i, j)u)p
add
ua =
λσ0,eu(i, j) then Pr(Φσ
k,eu(i, j) > Φσ0,eu(i, j)) >
1− 2exp
(
− (λ
σk,eu(i, j)−λσ0,eu(i, j))2
8λσ
k ,eu(i, j)λσ0,eu(i, j)
)
= 1−
2exp
(
− f (p(i, j)u, p(σ
k(i),σk( j))um2
)
, where f (., .)
is a function of p(i, j)u and p(σ
k(i),σk( j))u. After
further derivations, we obtain limn→∞Pr(Φ
σk,Eku\E
τ
u ≥
Φσ0,E
k
u\E
τ
u) = 1 and have Theorem 1 proved.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We first relate the adjacency matrix A with the tran-
sition probability matrix T as A = ΛT , where Λ is a
diagonalmatrix andΛ(i, i) = deg(i). Then we analyze
the utility distance for the anonymized graph. When
w= 1, we can prove ||Aa−A||1 = ||ΛaT a−ΛT ||1 =
||(ΛaT a−ΛaT +ΛaT −ΛT )||1 ≥ ||Λa||1||T a−T ||1.
Since the element in the diagonal of Λa is greater than
1, we have ||Aa−A||1 ≥ ||T a− T ||1. Therefore, we
can obtainUa≤Ua(w). Similarly, we haveUu≤Uu(w).
Incorporating these two inequalities into Eqs. 3,4,5,6,
we have Theorem 2 satisfied under w = 1. Next, we
considerw≥ 1. It is easy to prove that ||T wa −T
w||1≤
w||T a−T ||1 so ||T
w
a −T
w||1 ≤ w||Aa−A||1. There-
fore, we haveUa≤wUa(w)+1−w. Similarly, we also
haveUu ≤ wUu(w)+1−w for the auxiliary graph. In-
corporating these two inequalities into Eqs. 3,4,5,6,
we have Theorem 2 proved.
7.3 Proof of Utility and Privacy
Trade-off
For the anonymization method of Hay et al.
in (Hay et al., 2007), we have Pdela = ka/Ma and
Padda = ka/(
(
N
2
)
−Ma). Similarly, we have P
del
u =
ku/Mu and P
add
u = ku/(
(
N
2
)
−Mu). Based on our
utility metric in Definition 1, we have Uu = 1 −
2R× noiseu and Ua = 1− 2R× noisea. Consider-
ing the sparsity property in most real-world structural
graphs (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008), the utility
condition for achieving successful de-anonymization
is restricted by Eq. 3, which can be represented as
noiseu+ l× noisea <
l
2
. Consider the worst-case at-
tacker who has access to perfect auxiliary informa-
tion, i.e., noiseu = 0. Therefore, we have noisea <
0.25.
